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deal of ambiguity attaches to the question as to the

meaning of the term 'Hfe". The term "Hfe" has usually been
"the initial question of Biolconfined to biological phenomena
ogy", we are told, "is the nature and characteristics of living mat;

—

the determination of that wherein 'livingness' consists."^ The
term "life" has been taken to be the characteristic quality which is
common to plants, animals and man and which distinguishes them
ter

from
warns

all

us,

other things in nature.
is

Prof.

"Life",

distinctively a biological concept

risk in transferring

it

to other fields.-

In

its

J.

A.

and there

is

Thomson
always a

widest sense, "life"

may

be defined from the biological point of view as the manifestation of

and reaction between organism and environment. Or, as
it: "Life is the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations."
But this definition, Spencer thinks,
is abstract and to employ its more concrete equivalent we should
do well "to consider the internal relations as 'definite combinations
of simultaneous and successive changes' the external relations as
'co-existences and sequences' and the connection between them as
a correspondence.
Even so the definition, Spencer adds, is onesided, inasmuch as it recognizes only the form and not the body of
our conception of life.. "That which gives the substance of our
action

Spencer puts

;

;

"•''

idea of life is," he says, "a certain unspecified principle of activity.

The dynamic element in life is its essential element."* And this
dynamic element or principle of activity is, he maintains, unknown
and unknowable. What we are concerned with in science is alone
'J.

Y. Simpson, "Biology", Enc\clo{^cdia of Religion and Ethics,

\'o\. II, p.

622.

-"Life and Death". Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics,
^Principles of Biologx, Vol I, p. 100.
*Ibid., p. 114.

\'ol.

VIII,

p.

1.
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phenomena of Hfe which are accessible to our investigations,
this surface knowledge holds good within its own domain. Thus,
he argues, "The statement that the continuous adjustment of internal
the

and

relations to external relations constitutes Life as cognizable

by

us,

not invalidated by the admission that the reality in which these
Hence, for the purposes of
relations inhere is incognizable."^

is

science, the
sists

suffice for

above definition will

our purpose, but he

in-

that even so considered the definition should not include the

various abnormal manifestations, which do not properly come under
the term "life", though we may safely accept it as covering the

normal manifestations.
The "dynamic element", which is thus claimed by Spencer as
forming the essence of our conception of life, has perhaps found
They contend
explicit recognition in the writings of the Vitalists.
that mechanical or physico-chemical concepts do not suffice for the

treatment of biological facts.

Driesch, for example, postulates a

non-perceptual "vital agency", or, as he
is

calls

"entelechy", which
what he regards as

it,

associated with the organisms as distinct from

This "entelechy" directs the physico-chemical

non-living things.

processes in certain cases, so that their results are dififerent from

what they would have been apart from
lated entelechy

is

stellation", but

it

"not a
is

new

its

intervention.

This postu-

elemental consequence of some con-

supposed to be a genuine agent "at work".

In

autonomous
immaterial
and not
localization.
is
It
and without any seat or
in a
and
to
set
free,
is
to
suspend
Its function
physical energy.
inter-action.
inorganic
faculties
of
regulatory manner, pre-existing
Driesch's view the "entelechy"

Dr.

J.

is

non-spatial in nature,

C. Bose, the great Indian scientist,

jection of the theory of vitalism.

A

is

decisive in his re-

stimulus produces a certain

excitatory change in living substances and the excitation thus pro-

duced

may

express

itself in either

or electrical response.

duced expresses

of the two forms of mechanical

In mechanical response the excitation pro-

itself in a visible

while in electrical response

it

change of form as seen

expresses

itself

in muscle,

in certain electrical

changes, and not in any visible alteration, as in nerve or retina, and

while the mechanical

mode

of response

is

limited in

its

application,

form is universal. Bose further contends
mechanical and electrical modes of response are practically
the electrical

in character,
'^Ibid.. p.

and that not only can the

123.

electrical

mode

that the
identical

of response
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take the place of the mechanical one, but that the former has this

advantage that

it is

applicable

where the

latter

cal or electrical

Now.

cannot be used.

this irritabilitv' or responsiveness of the tissue, either in

form, was supposed to depend on

activity, seeing that under certain conditions

its

mechani-

its

physiological

could be converted

it

from a responsive to an irresponsive state, either temporarily, as
by anaesthetics, or permanently, as by poisons. From these facts
that a living tissue gives response, while a tissue that has been killed

does not.

it

was concluded

that

phenomenon of response is
And, Bose thinks, from a con-

the

characteristic of a living organism.

fusion of "dead" things with inanimate matter,
that inanimate matter

excited by stimulation.
exists a

"In

phenomenon which,

isms from

lifeless bodies,

cal explanation.

it

has been supposed

must be irresponsive or incapable of being
irritability", writes

as

was

Dr. A^erworn, "there

believed, distinguished

and appeared

to

mock

The unexplained conception

all

organ-

physico-chemi-

at a

of irritability, there-

....

became the starting-point of vitalism or the doctrine
of I'ifal force, which in its most complete form asserted a distinct
The vitalists soon laid
dualism of living and lifeless nature
aside more or less completely mechanical and chemical explanations
of vital phenomena, and introduced, as an explanatory principle, an
all-controlling, unknown and inscrutable force hypermechanique.
While chemical and physical forces are responsible for all phefore,

nomena

in lifeless bodies, in living

duces and rules

all

actions."

vital

organisms

this special force in-

In opposition to the

vitalists'

assumption of the super-physical character of response Dr. Bose
urges that the necessity for maintaining such a dualism in nature
fall to the ground if it can be shown
amongst inorganic substances also, and he

must, on theoretical grounds,
that similar effects obtain

claims to have

shown

that not only the fact of response, but

all

those

modifications in response which occur under various conditions take

As
phenomena

ground of

place alike in metals, plants and animal tissues.

a

contention, Dr. Bose parallelises these

as exhibited in

the three classes of substances.

He

his

maintains that in a living animal

under stimulation the wave of molecular disturbance is accompam"ed by a wave of electrical disturbance. This characteristic
of exhibiting electrical response under stimulation on the part of
animal tissues is, he contends, not confined to it alone, but extends
to vegetable tissues in a like manner.
In these cases Dr. Bose
tissue

^General Physiolngy,

p.

18.
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and

shown
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nerve

electrical variations as in

pass to inorganic substances, and

use experimental arrangements similar to those used in the case
of animal and vegetable tissues,

evoked

in metals

under

we

find the

To

stimulation.'^

same

electrical

responses

establish this contention

Dr. Bose tries to show experimentally the similarity, nay the essential identity,

between some of the phenomena and

their modifications,

which are connected with their responsive character, in all cases,
animal, vegetable and metal. This is corroborated in the cases of
negative variation, relation between stimulus and response, efifect of
superposition, uniform responses, fatigue, staircase effect, increased response after continuous stimulation, modified response,
diphasic variation, effect of temperature, effect of chemical reagents,
etc.®

As

drawn from the above

Bose
found
There is
to be only a repetition of response seen in the inorganic.
in it no element of mystery or caprice, such as we must admit to be
applied in the assumption of a hypermechanical vital force, acting in
contradiction or defiance of those physical laws that govern the
world of matter. Nowhere in the entire range of these responsephenomena inclusive as that is of metals, plants and animals do
The study of processes
we detect any breach of continuity
apparently so complex as those of irritability .... must be faced,
and their investigation patiently pursued, without the postulation of
special forces whose convenient property is to meet all emergencies
a conclusion

observes

:

"Living response in

all its

considerations, Dr.

diverse manifestations

is

—

—

vagueness
Amongst the phenomena of reno necessity for the assumption of vital force. They
are, on the contrary, physico-chemical phenomena, susceptible of a
physical inquiry as definite as any other in inorganic regions.®'
in virtue of their

sponse there

is

"Irritability" is considered by Bose to be due ultimately to
"molecular responsiveness", and excitatory response to be "brought

about by the molecular derangem.ent consequent on stimulus, with
the subsequent self-recovery,"®" and he insists that similar excitatory

response

is

given

"Irritability or

Tor

even

by inorganic

matter under

stimulation.

molecular responsiveness, therefore," observes Dr.

an account of the experiments, see

J.

C. Rose, Response in the Living

and Non-Living, Longmans Green & Co.
^Ihid.
^^Ibid., pp. 189-190.
^''See Plant Response,

Longmans, Green &

Co., p. 741.

.j

...

i
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Bose, "must be regarded not as characteristic of organic substances
In the case of what

alone, but as the universal property of matter.
is

commonly known

ties,

as the living,

with greater instabiUties,

stimulus

is

molecular

higher complexi-

structure.

External

here liable to induce greater derangement, and the

reversible molecular change
easily, the

we have merely

of

known

as death takes place the

ir-

more

more highly organized the complexes may be

In

studving the responsive phenomena of living organisms, therefore,

we must

fix

our attention on their molecular aspect, and try to

follow out the physico-chemical changes which are consequent on
the molecular derangement induced by stimulus."^

So

far as physical science goes, I think

Bose has perhaps sufficient
which seems

justification in resisting the vitalists' conception of life,

The
be one-sided and insufficient.^"
holding
thwarting
or
solely
"entelechy" as

in

mechanical processes of the organism, as

the mechanical processes

to

if

vitalists'

notion

of

an

abeyance the so-called

mercy of the entelechy, seems
were simply blind and
and
from the point of view of
to be contrary to ascertained fact,
In an essay on "Life and Mtal
science it can hardly be sustained.
Energy" which forms the introduction to Rudolph Wagner's
Handzcorterbiich dcr Physiology, Lotze long ago contended for what
entirely at the

is

called the mechanical

view

to a place in the science of physiology.

In criticising the theory of vitalism as a scientific principle or doc^Ibid., p. 741.
^°Recent scientific researches in biology

and physiology confirm

in

essence

the contention that a physico-chemical explanation of vital fadts holds good
so far as science is concerned e. g., Dr. J. S. Haldane holds that a "mechanistic
theory of life" is correct so far as it goes, and that the two great physical laws
of the conservation of matter and of energy can he justifiably extended to all
Or, in other words, scientifically
living organisms, including human beings.
regarded, however complex the changes involved in organic activity may be,
they are, at any rate, changes in a material system. Hence, in a sense, biology
may be regarded as the physics and chemistry of organisms, i. e., vital or organic changes are physico-chemical changes. Thus among the biologists and
physiologists the prevailing opinion is growing in favour of the mechanistic
theory as supplying a clear working hypothesis without the postulation of a
vital force.
(See Mechanism, Life and Personality, Lee. I.)
In the same
strain Prof. R. F. A. Hoernle, Dr. J. Johnstone, L. J. Henderson, etc., hold
that so far as science is concerned the mechanistic theory of life oiitains equally
in both the domains of the so-called "organic" and "inorganic"'.
In Dr. Johnstone's view, as science is concerned only with the description of "givcness",
and a "givcnness" is but one, though we arbitrarily divide it into two domains
of the organic and inorganic, there can only be one way of describing it ami
that way is the mechanistic one. (See f^hilflsflphy and Biolofiy, Tntro.)
Similarly, Prof. Hoernle maintains that if we abstract from a scientific description
of the i)henomena of life its Ideological character, then what arc called '"organism" and "machine" both alike can be analysed and their changes described in
physico-chemical terms. (Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, Chap. VI.)
;
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that

however

may

be

peculiar,

in itself,

it

what the

can never be

same matter which is known to Uh
to be subject to physical laws of its own, and that the conclusion
which the facts suggest is that the phenomena of Life arise out of
a special combination of material elements, no one of which has any
free

from

interaction with that

claim to be called exclusively or pre-eminently the principle of

life.

view the mechanical view, though true, can in no
sense be regarded as final." I shall, however, try to show that the
theory of vitalism has perhaps some value from the point of view of
philosophy. No doubt, the definition of life ofifered by Spencer as

But

in Lotze's

the "adjustment of internal relations to external relations"

is

only a

formal one, i. e., it describes only the occurrences that tak^ place between the organism and the environment, but that which Spencer
called the material aspect of the conception of life and which he
perhaps rightly thought to form the essential feature of the conception, lies in the principle of activity of w^hich these occurrences

are manifestations.

It is

with the occurrences that science

may be

and philosophy with the active principle, and
considering the matter from the scientific point of view.

said to be concerned,

Dr. Bose

is

His view of life as consisting in "response to stimulus" may be said
to correspond in certain respects to the formal definition of life
given by Spencer. According to Dr. Bose, as we have seen, the responsive action, or, as he calls

it,

"irritability", is "ultimately

molecular Tesponsi^'eness and excitatory response

is

due to

brought about by

the molecular derangement consequent on stimulus with the sub-

sequent self recovery."

Or. in Spencer's words,

it

may perhaps

be said that the internal relations are adjusted to external relations
in

an act of response.

But so far only

is

there agreement.

The

intimate connection, nay the essential identity, between physical and
physiological

phenomena

of response which Bose has attempted to

prove, and in which he finds the strongest ground for attributing
"inorganic", would find no support from Spencer
and the physiologists who adhere to the division of nature into "organic" and inorganic."
This, however, is but one side of the story. The other side coni^Lotze's contention is now upheld by Dr. J. S. Haldane, Prof. R. F. A.
life to the so-called

Hoernle, Dr. J. Johnstone, L. J. Henderson, etc., who, though advocating a
universal maintenance of the mechanistic theory of life so far as scientific
description is concerned, do not regard it as, in any way, the final, nay it is.
according to them, wholly insufficient and erroneous as a final explanation of
the phenomena of life.
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trying to discern what

sists in

festations,

Kant

as

for,

said,

lies

behind these processes or mani-

"life

means the capacity

change according to an internal principle."
ception of

may

life

to

act

or

This side of our con-

be said in Spencer's words to form the material

aspect or the "body" of such a conception.

The

internal principle

is

perhaps what Spencer meant by the "dynamic element" or the
"principle of activity", or in the vitalists' phraseology "entelechy",
of which the processes of

The

life

may

be said to be manifestations.

true justification for any such conception as this

must be

fur-

by philosophy. But for a fuller or more complete
understanding of what we mean by life we must take into consideration both the sides and try to understand the one in the light of the
other.
The contention of Bose that the law of conservation of
energy holds good in the action and reaction between the organism
nished,

if at all,

and the environment, as it obtains elsewhere, and that it introduces
no mystical power such as would in any part thwart or place in
abeyance the action of forces already operative, thus evinces itself
Prof. J. A. Thomson writes: "In the domain of the
in its true light.
inorganic there is little individuality, no apparent freedom of action,
no endeavour, no purposiveness, no learning in the school of time.
But its uniformity has been a probably indispensable fulcrum for
The mechanical law of the conservation of
the lever of will."^energy has been maintained to hold good only in the realm of what
Dr. Bose, on the other hand, has tried to
is called inorganic nature.
show that this law holds good in both the domains of the so-called
"organic"" and "inorganic".
It should be o1)served that Bose's explanation is. in no sense, materialistic.
Quite the contrary. The
drift of his thought is towards spiritualism and he all along tries to
How then are we to
dispose of the conception of "dead matter".
understand Bose's position? I think in this way. It has been customary to describe the workings or actions of the so-called "inorganic" things in nature as simply blind and mechanical and as
taking place solely in accordance with mechanical laws.
But this
may be said to be rather an assumption than a statement of fact.

The admission
cither
ates

tha*"

wholly or

tin's

view.

in

The

"insignia of life have not yet been discerned
tlicir

proper perspective" perhaps corrobor-

action and reaction which takes place alike be-

tween the organism and its environment and a so-called "thing" and
its environment, or as Bose calls it its responsive action, consists in
^•Systi'in of

Animate Nature,

p.

75.
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every particle plays a part in the re-

sponsive action, and while Bose insists that there

is

no necessity of

introducing a vital principle to explain this fact, the statement should

be taken with reserve. As a scientist Bose may be said to be concerned only with the phenomenal side of the problem of life, and

from

this point of view,

Ward

perhaps right

is

what he urges may be

in

Yet Prof.

true.

holding that "the real agents, whose ap-

pearances alone constitute the physiologists' phenomena, must be
In other words, the rearrangement of the

regarded as monads."^^

molecules, in which the responsive
not something blind, but

The

agents at work.

is

phenomenon

is

said to consist,

a phenomenal manifestation of

vitalists,

while pointing to the

all

is

real

important

principle of activity or the ''entelechy" even in the sphere of the socalled "living matter", leave unexplained
cal

what are

processes of the organism, which play, as

portant and essential part in what

may

is

called the

seen,

phenomena

an imof

life.

be said that neither the mechanistic theory

In this respect

it

nor vitalism

a sufficient explanation of the

is

called the mechani-

we have

phenomena

of

life,

and while they are but one-sided accounts and in opposition with
each other, pan-psychism or monadism claims to be able to replace
both.

'^^

Realm of Ends,

p.

462.

